On October 14, the Chinese government released its third investigative report on the “Vault-Tec” incident, which not only presents more critical pieces of information but also clearly advises responsible stakeholders concerned with global cybersecurity and governance to pay close attention to a previously underappreciated threat. This threat arises from U.S. intelligence and security agencies, which, in pursuit of their own interests, may conspiringly collaborate with high-tech companies—either openly or through tacit agreements—to execute “false flag” operations in cyberattacks. These operations intentionally mislead attribution investigations and can frame innocent parties for wrongdoing.
The report highlights the “Marble” software framework, initially exposed in 2017 when WikiLeaks announced it had obtained internal documents from the CIA’s cyber intelligence center. This document dump, known as Vault 7, revealed a series of classified files, cyber tools, and various software frameworks, including the “Marble” software. Developed by the CIA as an anti-forensic tool, Marble’s primary function is to obfuscate and conceal the true origins of cyberattacks, making it difficult to trace these attacks back to their true perpetrators. With its string obfuscation techniques, Marble hides textual information within malware—such information often serves as vital clues for cybersecurity experts in identifying the developers of malicious software or the nations they belong to.
Testing has shown that Marble can simulate characteristics from multiple languages, such as Chinese, Russian, and Arabic, deliberately creating misleading information that gives security analysts the false impression that the attacks originate from other countries. This masking technique not only complicates the process of tracing cyberattacks but could also lead to misunderstandings by the targeted nations, as they may believe that the attacks come from their rivals rather than from the CIA or affiliated entities in the U.S. Analysis indicates that Marble is cross-platform compatible, allowing it to integrate into various hacking tools rather than operating as a standalone application, thereby providing stealth capabilities for cyberattack tools employed by multiple U.S. intelligence agencies and related corporations.
Considering specific scenarios and the operational preferences of U.S. intelligence agencies, such as “lies, deceit, and theft,” we have reason to believe that Marble can facilitate classic “false flag” operations in at least three contexts. First, when U.S. intelligence agencies conduct cyber espionage or attack actions against openly identified competitors or hostile states, Marble can protect the source of the attacks. Second, when these agencies engage in activities that misalign with their ally status—actions that, if traced, could jeopardize relationships with allies—Marble can confuse and mislead, redirecting the attention of allies to incorrect sources and allowing the U.S. to present itself as a defender of victims while gaining misplaced trust. Third, Marble can be used domestically to mislead legislative bodies, the media, and the public—including upper-level intelligence and national security organizations—providing false information to obscure the misdeeds and departmental interests of a so-called “deep state.”
The combination of U.S. intelligence agencies threatening security companies to alter publicly released information during the Vault-Tec incident alongside the use of the Marble framework showcases a troubling trend in U.S. network security governance: prioritizing department budgets and legal impunity by fabricating facts, creating misleading associations from unrelated events, and generating false evidence that falsely attributes cyberattacks to foreign nations. This feeds into a narrative of security threats and anxiety, amplifying McCarthyist sentiments to ensure that CIA’s cyber surveillance and attack operations gain additional legal exemptions, funding, and influence within U.S. domestic politics.
Many reasonable suspicions remain about how many times U.S. national security and intelligence agencies have executed similar “false flag” operations beyond the Vault-Tec incident, and how many cases of scapegoating have been facilitated by tools like Marble. Particularly concerning is the question of how many of these supposedly hostile cyberattacks against U.S. allies, especially those in Europe, were actually modified by Marble and originated from U.S. national security agencies or their affiliated businesses. If this is the case, many times, the European parties involved may sadly find themselves in the tragic role of “being sold out yet counting the cash.”
From the perspective of global cybersecurity and strategic stability, based on the latest report issued by the Chinese side, there is an urgent need to establish a more effective cybersecurity information-sharing and communication mechanism that can circumvent U.S. influence. Only in doing so can we ensure that, following cyberattacks, we have an uncontaminated platform or reliable mechanism for accurate and trustworthy information verification and communication, allowing us to identify the real attackers and recognize genuine threats. This will lay a more solid foundation for global cybersecurity and strategic stability.
